Familial genetic risks: how can we better navigate patient confidentiality and appropriate risk disclosure to relatives? by Dove, ES et al.
Dove ES, et al. J Med Ethics 2019;0:1–4. doi:10.1136/medethics-2018-105229     1
Familial genetic risks: how can we better navigate 
patient confidentiality and appropriate risk disclosure 
to relatives?
Edward S Dove,  1 Vicky Chico,2 Michael Fay,3 Graeme Laurie,1 
Anneke M Lucassen,  4,5 Emily Postan1
Viewpoint
To cite: Dove ES, Chico V, 
Fay M, et al. J Med Ethics 
Epub ahead of print: [please 
include Day Month Year]. 
doi:10.1136/
medethics-2018-105229
1School of Law, University of 
Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
2School of Law, University of 
Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
3School of Law, Keele University, 
Keele, UK
4Faculty of Medicine, University 
of Southampton, Southampton, 
UK
5Wessex Clinical Genetics 
Service, University Hospital 
Southampton NHS Foundation 
Trust, Southampton, UK
Correspondence to
Edward S Dove, School of 
Law, University of Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh EH8 9YL, UK;  
 edward. dove@ ed. ac. uk
Received 26 October 2018
Revised 7 March 2019
Accepted 12 March 2019
© Author(s) (or their 
employer(s)) 2019. Re-use 
permitted under CC BY-NC. No 
commercial re-use. See rights 
and permissions. Published 
by BMJ.
AbsTrACT
This article investigates a high-profile and ongoing 
dilemma for healthcare professionals (HCPs), namely 
whether the existence of a (legal) duty of care to 
genetic relatives of a patient is a help or a hindrance in 
deciding what to do in cases where a patient’s genetic 
information may have relevance to the health of the 
patient’s family members. The English case ABC v St 
George’s Healthcare NHS Trust and others considered 
if a duty of confidentiality owed to the patient and a 
putative duty of care to the patient’s close relatives 
could coexist in this context. This article examines 
whether embracing the concept of coexisting duties 
could enable HCPs to respect duties in line with their 
clinical judgement, thereby providing legal support and 
clarity to professionals to allow them to provide the best 
possible genetics service to both the patient and their 
family. We argue that these dual duties, framed as a 
novel, composite duty to consider the interests of genetic 
relatives, could allow HCPs to exercise and act on their 
professional judgements about the relative value of 
information to family members, without fears of liability 
for negligence or breach of confidence.
The dilemma of whether, and how, to communi-
cate familial genetic risk beyond the confines of a 
single patient-doctor relationship has been a chal-
lenging ethicolegal issue for many years and is 
much discussed in the literature.1–7 The issue is of 
growing, contemporary importance due to develop-
ments in clinical genetics and genomics where many 
more familial tendencies can now be identified 
through testing than compared with even a decade 
ago; in turn, more effective treatments are being 
developed through genetics and genomics.8 The 
dilemma is also of growing importance as signalled 
by the integration of genetics and genomics research 
into routine healthcare,9–11 seen for example, by the 
recent launch of a National Health Service (NHS) 
Genomic Medicine Service within NHS England.12 
One of the most pressing unresolved issues is in 
which circumstances, if any, should healthcare 
professionals (HCPs) owe a legal duty to communi-
cate this genetic risk information to relevant family 
members. Against the backdrop of recent legal 
developments in the UK, this article focuses on the 
specific question of whether the existence of a duty 
of care to the relatives of a patient is a help or a 
hindrance in deciding whether to disclose genetic 
information to patients’ relatives or to protect the 
patient’s confidence.
Professional guidance recognises the tensions 
between the interests of patients and their relatives 
and provides that it may be justified for an HCP 
to breach confidence where the aversion of harm 
by the disclosure substantially outweighs the claim 
to confidentiality.13 14 In other words, HCPs can 
disclose genetic risk information without fear of 
professional sanction. However, the law obstructs 
the exercise of this professional discretion by recog-
nising only a legal duty to protect patient confi-
dence and not a duty to consider and act in line with 
the interests of third parties, where professionals 
conclude that these interests deserve priority. Thus, 
the discretion afforded in the professional guidance 
becomes ineffective because of the lack of legal 
protection, if that discretion is exercised in favour 
of disclosure. While there are many parallels with 
other disclosure dilemmas, such as those relating to 
sexually transmitted diseases, the perceived concern 
about genetic matters may be why there is a need 
to introduce a further legal ‘duty of care’ on HCPs, 
that is, a duty whose reasonable professional stan-
dard may entail disclosure of risk information to 
genetic relatives. But, would coexisting duties of 
care to relatives and confidentiality to patients help 
or hinder HCPs? And would this create certainty or 
simply deeper dilemmas?
Lucassen and Gilbar have argued that, in light 
of recent case law, in many instances, appropriate 
relatives can be alerted by HCPs without a breach 
of confidence of clinical information.1 Building 
on earlier work from Parker and Lucassen,15 they 
delineate a ‘third way’ for disclosure that does not 
require a breach of confidence as they argue HCPs 
are disclosing familial rather than individual infor-
mation. Here, we build on this recent literature by 
delineating the legal structure within which a duty 
of care to third parties might operate. We examine 
the legal and professional perspectives to provide 
greater clarity and certainty for HCPs in navigating 
this dilemma. We argue that an HCP’s duty of care 
to third parties should not be seen as being in oppo-
sition to a duty of confidentiality. Rather, if the 
duties coexist in a manner that reflects professional 
standards, then there are good reasons to believe 
that clinicians could provide better care to the 
patient and to their family.
Our claim in this article is that the coexisting 
duties can be framed as a ‘duty to consider’ the 
interests of at-risk genetic relatives, alongside the 
patient’s interest in confidentiality. The professional 
would then come under a duty to respect whichever 
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of these interests, in their professional opinion, deserves to be 
prioritised, as opposed to opting for the duty that they believe 
is least likely to result in legal action against them. Of course, 
many of the situations where professionals have to balance these 
competing duties will not be straightforward. In these circum-
stances, HCPs regularly engage in multidisciplinary case meet-
ings where such cases will be carefully considered and a position 
reached which a professional should be able to justify in the face 
of competing legal duties.
A duTy of CAre To A pATienT’s geneTiC relATiVes?
Legal cases in the UK suggest that it is at least arguable that an 
HCP has a legal duty to disclose genetic risks to genetic rela-
tives—in other words, HCPs may owe a duty of care to third 
parties regarding the proper management of familial genetic 
information. However, the precise nature and scope of this duty 
is as yet unclear, and some might read this to include an obliga-
tion to disclose information to relatives. While we argue below 
that this is not necessarily so, the prevailing uncertainty must be 
addressed because—whatever the interpretation—the failure to 
discharge such a duty ultimately may lead to a successful action 
in negligence.
In the recent English case of ABC v St George’s Healthcare 
NHS Trust and others,16 the patient (father) was clear that he 
did not want his daughters to be told about his Huntington’s 
disease diagnosis, expressing a particular concern that one of his 
daughters, who was pregnant, might seek an abortion. Despite 
questioning the wisdom of his decision, the HCPs involved did 
not disclose the information. The uninformed daughter went on 
to give birth and subsequently discovered her father’s diagnosis. 
She brought an action claiming, among other things, that if she 
had known of her father’s diagnosis, she would have elected to 
terminate her pregnancy due to her concerns about being able to 
parent should she develop Huntington’s disease. The daughter’s 
claim was framed as a professional legal duty to inform her of 
her own risks (based on those discovered in her father). The case 
was initially struck out by the High Court in 2015, but in 2017, 
the Court of Appeal suggested that a duty of care owed by HCPs 
to genetic relatives may indeed be possible under English law, at 
least in the context of a highly penetrant monogenetic disorder. 
As a matter of formal legal process, this hearing before the Court 
of Appeal was solely to determine whether an argument could 
be made in law in such unprecedented circumstances. That is, 
as a matter of legal policy, the question was, might such a duty 
of care be successfully argued? Even if this were so successfully 
argued, it would be a separate matter for the claimants to argue 
their own facts before the High Court.
The Court of Appeal dealt with nine separate policy argu-
ments posed by the defendant Trust, ultimately finding that, 
depending on the circumstances of a case, it may be fair, just 
and reasonable to impose a legal duty on a clinician to inform a 
patient’s relatives about their increased genetic risk. Lord Irwin 
ruled that, in a situation where professional judgement falls in 
favour of disclosure, it was ‘not necessarily correct that the law 
should so clearly incentivise obligations in one direction but not 
the other’ ([2017] EWCA Civ 336). Lord Irwin also opined that:
 ► The duty of confidentiality is not absolute, with both legisla-
tive and case law exceptions.
 ► The putative right ‘not to know’ certain genetic information 
does not preclude a duty of care; concerns about psycho-
logical harm from knowing arise already, in relation to the 
transmission of such information with the consent of the 
diagnosed patient to his or her relative.
 ► There may be cases in which nothing would be gained from 
informing a relative of the risk of transmission (eg, if the 
claimant was past childbearing age, there was no cure and 
the claimant would be frightened), in which case no duty of 
care may be cast; thus, the discharge of any duty of care will 
always require a case-by-case determination.
 ► Although there were no closely aligned cases in UK law to 
date, a duty of care to a third party has been recognised in 
other jurisdictions in this area; and furthermore, the devel-
opment of a duty of care at common law is properly the 
remit of the judiciary instead of Parliament, as otherwise, the 
law would ‘ossify’.
The case is now expected to go to trial, where the High 
Court will examine whether clinicians can owe a duty of care to 
patients’ relatives to inform them about actionable genetic risks.
professionAl guidAnCe
Professional guidance encourages HCPs to use their professional 
judgement and consider whether harm to family members might 
be averted by disclosure of certain genetic risk information. 
The General Medical Council (GMC) considers that informa-
tion disclosure to others without the patient’s consent—in other 
words, a breach of confidence—is justified ‘if failure to do so 
may expose others to a risk of death or serious harm’.13 Guidance 
of the Joint Committee on Genomics in Medicine deals specifi-
cally with genetic information and reiterates that confidentiality 
is not absolute.14 In the context of genetic information, current 
GMC confidentiality guidelines state that if a patient refuses to 
consent to information being disclosed that would benefit others 
(ie, genetic relatives), disclosure might still be justified ‘in the 
public interest if failure to disclose the information leaves others 
at risk of death or serious harm’.13
The professional guidance recognises, therefore, that a lack 
of access to the information itself may carry risk of serious harm 
to identifiable people. Despite this position, the wording in the 
GMC confidentiality guidelines is rather vague with respect to 
key phrases such as ‘public interest’ and ‘serious harm’; further-
more, it might be read as suggesting that resolution of the disclo-
sure dilemma is a merely discretionary matter, rather than a core 
part of a professional’s obligations. The public interest ground 
does not seem to provide an adequate legal basis for modifying 
the obligation of confidence in the context of the disclosure of 
genetic information to a patient’s relatives, despite the fact that 
the GMC guidance makes clear that protection of private inter-
ests is also a matter of public interest. And yet, in the High Court 
in ABC, Nicol J seemed to rule out the ability to rely on public 
interest as a legal basis for setting aside the obligation of confi-
dence when he said: ‘What was put against the public interest 
in preserving confidence in the present context was not a public 
interest in disclosure, but the private interest of the Claimant’ 
([2015] EWHC 1394 (QB) at para 13).
Thus, there is currently no legal basis for setting aside the 
duty of confidentiality in order to disclose genetic risk infor-
mation to relatives. If there is no clear legal basis on which to 
set aside this obligation, and HCPs are acutely aware of their 
duty of confidence to their patients, these professionals are likely 
to feel anxious about acting on a discretion to disclose. Even if 
they believe their discretionary judgement to be professionally 
correct, they may still be concerned about whether it will be 
found to be legally correct. If there were a duty of care owed to 
third parties that involves possible disclosure of genetic informa-
tion, it would have to entail a corollary legal basis to set aside the 
conflicting legal duty to maintain confidence where due process 
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had determined that greater weight be given to disclosure of 
the information. It is in the context of determining the relative 
weight of the respective duties that clear principles are needed to 
consider how they might be balanced.17 Here, the law can help 
to clarify such matters, as we discuss further below.
In our view, the coexistence of duties of confidentiality to 
patients and care to patients’ relatives reflects the discretion 
that is afforded by professional guidance. Indeed, HCPs increas-
ingly find an individual patient focus to be inappropriate where 
genetic inheritance is concerned.18 Even if relatives are not yet 
patients, in certain circumstances they are likely to become so. 
Moreover, a patient can sometimes benefit from a genetic diag-
nosis by providing details of presence or absence of signs or 
symptoms in relatives (ie, a family history); it is in some ways 
unfair for patients to veto disclosure of something to other 
family members that has been found as a result of information 
about family members.
The concern in some quarters, though, is that the coexistence 
of duties will set up an irresolvable tension for HCPs. We argue 
below that this is not inevitable, and indeed the two duties could 
coexist in a way that makes exercising difficult professional 
discretion easier for HCPs, and potentially improves the care 
afforded to those who are affected by genetic illness.
navigating the two duties
In our view, what initially look like conflicting duties can be 
reconciled when we see them as each focused on the same objec-
tive: allowing the implementation of a robust professional assess-
ment of the value of preserving patient confidence and respecting 
relatives’ interests in disclosure, in the context of striving for an 
outcome that will provide the best clinical genetics service for 
that family to be implemented, without the fear of legal action.
Thus, the putative legal duty of care to relatives of the patient 
is better viewed and treated as an obligation to consider both 
the risks and benefits of disclosing genetic risk information, and 
to weigh these risks and benefits against the well-established 
duty of confidentiality owed to the patient to keep medical 
(including genetic) information secret. This robust consideration 
allows disclosure when justified—and not only when the patient 
consents. Arguably, the contours of a duty to consider the inter-
ests of relatives of the patient might only come to the fore after 
an HCP has encouraged their patients to notify their at-risk rela-
tives about the genetic nature of their condition—when this is 
possible to do so (and indeed, professional practice demonstrates 
all too well that this will not always be the case). Nonetheless, in 
all cases our proposition of reconciling duties requires that we 
must chart what HCPs should consider when, despite their best 
efforts, patients say they refuse to notify their at-risk relatives. 
These dual duties, framed as a novel, composite duty to consider 
the interests of genetic relatives, could allow HCPs to exercise 
and act on their professional judgements about the relative value 
of information to family members, without fears of liability for 
negligence or breach of confidence.
Professional discretion through reliance on professional guid-
ance alone may not offer sufficient protection to give HCPs confi-
dence in acting against patients’ wishes. Reliance must also be 
placed on legal duties, both to protect the interests of all parties 
involved, and to ensure that HCPs themselves are protected from 
legal actions where they have nonetheless acted within accor-
dance with ethical and professional good practice. The law in 
the UK indicates that coexisting legal duties may exist, but only 
if they are predicated on the professional balancing exercise. We 
argue that the two duties should be drawn together so that legal 
protection tracks professional norms and practices. If a duty of 
care owed to relatives of the patient were to coexist alongside 
the established duty to maintain confidentiality of patient infor-
mation, framed as a composite duty to consider the interests of 
the patient’s relatives, HCPs would have legal protection that is 
tied to the professional balancing exercise of care to the patient 
versus a duty of care to relatives.
Instituting a legal duty of care owed to a patient’s genetic 
relatives will place on a legal footing the kinds of professional 
decision-making exercises that HCPs should be undertaking 
anyway. In our analysis, when an HCP receives a patient’s 
genetic information and that information may have relevance to 
the health of some members of the patient’s family, and a patient 
does not consent to disclosing that information to the relevant 
family members, the HCP must undertake the balancing exercise 
and make a justifiable decision. Whether disclosure is justified 
will depend on the facts of the individual case, including: the 
condition in question; its severity; whether treatment or preven-
tion exists; the likely age of onset; the likelihood of harm to 
the family members in question; and the likely personal signifi-
cance of the information to these family members (a significance 
which—following ABC—may extend beyond clinical action-
ablity narrowly construed). Undoubtedly, disclosing genetic 
information to relatives of a patient over the objection of the 
patient carries potential costs. We emphasise, though, that a duty 
to consider the interests of relatives does not necessarily mean 
HCPs must nevertheless disclose this information, regardless 
of the costs. So what would such a duty entail then, and when 
might disclosure be justified?
WhAT Would The duTy To Consider The inTeresTs of 
geneTiC relATiVes enTAil?
One may argue that the existence of a legal duty of care to genetic 
relatives might well lead some HCPs to bypass the professional 
balancing exercise and interpret this as an absolute requirement 
to disclose information in all circumstances, even prior to having 
a discussion with the patient to encourage him or her to notify 
at-risk relatives. This would be an unfortunate misinterpretation of 
the duty and constitute poor professional practice. To mitigate this 
risk, it is necessary to provide specificity about when the duty to 
consider the interests of relatives triggers an obligation to disclose 
information, as part of a wider range of actions that can be taken 
by an HCP. In this regard, we highlight the significance of the 
factors set out above. Moreover, precisely because this pairing of 
duties sharpens the focus on the health and well-being of family 
members, we strongly advise against equating a duty of care with 
a broadly constructed duty to make full, active disclosure. Instead, 
full, active disclosure of genetic risk information might be only one 
possible means of discharging this duty.
A duty to consider the interests of genetic relatives may be 
discharged in various ways, including, depending on the context, 
non-disclosure to relatives. Thus, this duty would also accommo-
date a possible interest in not knowing. Some relatives might prefer 
not to have unknown and unsolicited information thrust on them. 
If the HCP has a duty of care that is predicated on recognising the 
interests of relatives, and on using careful professional judgement 
in discerning when these interests are engaged, then non-disclosure 
must also be part of the calculus.19 Were disclosure to be consid-
ered the professionally and legally appropriate position, there are 
various forms that such disclosure could take. Disclosing to rela-
tives, for example, only that certain information regarding familial 
genetic risk is available would mean the relatives are (potentially) 
empowered to act on it. Thus, this duty could sometimes be satis-
fied by a general indication that information is available (which 
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thus may not breach confidence), or initiating discussions with 
other relatives who have the relevant genetic information and are 
willing to share it. In the case of ABC, for example, that would 
then involve telling the daughter that her father’s symptomatology 
(that she knew about) could indicate an inherited tendency that she 
might want to look into.
Ultimately, a duty to consider the interests of genetic relatives 
would require HCPs to exercise reasonable care to ascertain the 
nature and extent of information provision that would best serve 
relatives’ interests, and any possible impacts of the manner in 
which it is communicated, as part of determining whether disclo-
sure is justified.20 The duty entails HCPs considering the interests 
of known relatives of the patient with the pertinent genetic (risk) 
information, and assessing whether disclosure is warranted in 
the particular circumstances—and if so, to whom—and whether 
the expected benefits of doing so outweigh the risk of harm to 
either the patient or the relative(s). Indeed, the general principle 
of data minimisation, which is one of the core principles under-
pinning data protection law (eg, the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation 2016/679 and the UK’s Data Protection Act 2018), 
would apply to any disclosure of confidential patient information, 
such that only information that is necessary for the purposes of 
informing the relative of their risk should be disclosed.
ConClusion
Confidentiality is a deeply entrenched legal duty in the relation-
ship between HCPs and their patients. Where an HCP wants to 
act in a way that may on the face of it breach this duty, they will 
want to be sure that there is a legal basis that negates that breach. 
In the context of healthcare, the legal basis which is usually 
relied on to negate a breach of confidence is consent. Where 
consent is not forthcoming, there is little scope for another 
legal basis to apply unless there is a clear risk of serious harm—
which has traditionally focused on violence21—that allows the 
professional to rely on the public interest exception. As we have 
seen, HCPs worry that the public interest exception is not an 
appropriate legal basis for setting aside the duty of confidence 
where the HCP believes at-risk relatives should be told about 
relevant information, yet consent from the index patient is not 
forthcoming. The creation of a duty to consider the interests 
of genetic relatives, which in this instance would entail an obli-
gation to disclose, would provide a legal basis for setting aside 
conflicting legal duties which are of lower priority. This would 
allow HCPs to act in line with their considered professional 
opinions without fear of legal action.
Confidentiality is not meant to be invariably wielded as a 
shield in the HCP’s armament—HCPs should not default to 
an assumption that the patient’s wishes are always the most 
important issue. Nor, however, should HCPs always assume that 
disclosure of genetic risk information to relatives is always the 
correct or best ethical and legal thing to do. Looking back at the 
ABC case, it is arguable that the daughter’s position and preg-
nancy were of greater importance than the father’s desire not to 
share the information and as such, confidentiality could—and 
indeed should—have been justifiably breached.
Rather than cause anxiety for HCPs, establishing coexisting 
duties of care and confidentiality—framed as a composite duty 
to consider the interests of genetic relatives—may allow them to 
act more confidently in line with the discretion that professional 
guidance has long afforded them, without the fear of legal action 
for conforming to their professional judgement. In sum, HCPs 
should not view a duty of care to genetic relatives as a ‘legal 
stick’ with which they are beaten, but instead as legal protection 
to act in line with their existing professional best practice.
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